Touro Law Review
Volume 28
Number 3 Annual New York State Constitutional
Law Issue

Article 18

August 2012

Do Automobile Passengers Have a Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy? An Analysis of Reasonable Expectation Under The Fourth
Amendment - People v. Howard
Lisa Belrose
Touro Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons,
Evidence Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Belrose, Lisa (2012) "Do Automobile Passengers Have a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy? An Analysis
of Reasonable Expectation Under The Fourth Amendment - People v. Howard," Touro Law Review: Vol. 28:
No. 3, Article 18.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/18

This Fourth Amendment and Automobiles is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro
Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Do Automobile Passengers Have a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy? An
Analysis of Reasonable Expectation Under The Fourth Amendment - People v.
Howard
Cover Page Footnote
28-3

This fourth amendment and automobiles is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/
lawreview/vol28/iss3/18

Belrose: Expectation of Privacy

DO AUTOMOBILE PASSENGERS HAVE A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY? AN ANALYSIS OF
REASONABLE EXPECTATION UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Howard1
(decided May 9, 2011)
The defendant, Dustin Howard, was arrested when the police
observed a revolver in the car, in which he was a passenger.2 Howard
was ultimately convicted of attempted criminal possession in the
fourth degree.3 The defendant sought to challenge the search of the
vehicle and seizure of the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds that
“the officer‟s directive that the vehicle be moved, transform[ed] what
might otherwise be a mere investigatory approach to a stationary vehicle into a full-blown vehicle stop.”4 The criminal court denied the
defendant‟s motion to suppress the evidence, and the appellate term
affirmed, holding that defendant failed to meet his burden of proving
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle.5

1

928 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Term 2d Dep‟t 2011).
Id. at 158.
3
Id.
4
Id. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent part that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Similarly, New York‟s Constitution reads in pertinent part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .” N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12.
5
Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The court also relied on the fact that the car was not in a
lawful location at the time of the initial approach by police, and the vehicle was not stopped
by police. Id.
2
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Defendant was a passenger in an illegally parked car that was
obstructing traffic on a one-way street.6 As the police approached the
vehicle, an officer asked the vehicle operator to move the car.7 The
operator, who was outside of the vehicle, responded by asking the defendant, who was the rear-seated passenger, to move the car out of
the way.8 After the defendant drove the car to a legal space, the officers asked for identification and permission to search the car.9 Simultaneously, another officer saw a gun on the floor of the car where
defendant was originally seated.10 At that point, the police officers
arrested the defendant, the other passenger in the vehicle, and the
original operator of the vehicle.11
After he was “convicted of attempted criminal possession of a
weapon in the fourth degree,”12 the defendant challenged his conviction alleging that the order to move the car amounted to a Fourth
Amendment seizure of his person and, therefore, conferred standing
on him to challenge the seizure and resulting search of the vehicle.13
The defendant based his claim that he was subject to a Fourth
Amendment14 stop, as the driver, or alternatively, as the passenger in
the car.15 The defendant also alleged rights under a New York statutory presumption of possession, which would automatically provide
him with standing to challenge the stop and search of the car.16
6

Id.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The request to search the car was denied. Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
14
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The constructive possession statute in New York is N.Y.
PENAL LAW §265.15 [3] (McKinney 2011). Although defendant attempted to claim this presumption it was not the basis of the prosecution‟s complaint against him (attempted constructive possession, N.Y. PENAL LAW §10.00[8] (McKinney 2011)) and was quickly set
aside by the court as irrelevant in his case. Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
15
Id.
16
Id. N.Y PENAL LAW §265.15 [3] is a constructive possession statute that states:
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus, of any firearm, large capacity ammunition feeding device, defaced
firearm, defaced rifle or shotgun, defaced large capacity ammunition
feeding device, firearm silencer, explosive or incendiary bomb, bombshell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal
knuckle knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, plastic knuckles,
7
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The court began its analysis in Howard, with the fact that the
initial police observation and approach of the car was legal and proper because the police were conducting a mere investigatory approach.17 The issue came down to whether the police order to move
the vehicle amounted to a stop and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.18 The court began with the basic premise that a passenger may
challenge the constitutionality of a police stop and the search of a vehicle.19 However, the court also noted that “a mere passenger in a
vehicle already stopped has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the vehicle‟s interior.”20
The United States Supreme Court enunciated the current rule
of passenger standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment violation as
a factor-driven test in Rakas v. Illinois.21 The Court in Rakas was
specifically concerned with the ability of a car passenger to challenge
a search of a vehicle in which a rifle and shells were seized.22 The
Court held that the passengers did not have standing to challenge the
search because they did not claim property or possessory rights to the
car or in the items seized.23 The Court‟s ruling effectively established the rule that a mere passenger in a car has no standing to challenge a search of the vehicle‟s interior without some legitimate exmetal knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presumptive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile
at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under
the following circumstances: (a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance
is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein; (b) if such
weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and
proper pursuit of his or her trade, then such presumption shall not apply
to the driver; or (c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one
of the occupants, not present under duress, has in his or her possession a
valid license to have and carry concealed the same.
17
Howard, 928 N.YS.2d at 158-59; see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (holding police shining flashlight into Brown‟s stopped vehicle did not trigger Fourth Amendment
protections); People v. Valerio, 710 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2000) (holding
police possessed objective and proper reason to approach car because it was illegally double
parked).
18
Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
19
Id. (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-56 (2007)).
20
Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978)).
21
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
22
Id. at 129.
23
Id. at 148.
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pectation of privacy therein.24
The Court in Rakas stated that to have standing there are “two
inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has
alleged „injury in fact,‟ and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for
relief upon the rights of third parties.”25 The Court stated that to determine whether the Fourth Amendment protects an individual it is
necessary to determine “whether the disputed search and seizure has
infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment
was designed to protect.”26 The determinative factor is whether the
individual has “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place.”27
The Court then explained that the expectation is not only a
subjective expectation, but also one that is objectively reasonable,
based upon society‟s willingness to recognize that expectation as reasonable.28 Factors to be considered in this analysis, according to the
24

Id. at 130-31. With this decision, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978). The defendant in Rakas argued that Jones applied to him because the search was
directed or aimed at him or, in the alternative, that he was “ „legitimately on [the] premises‟
at the time of the search.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. 257). The test that
had been established in Jones was that to establish standing a person must have some possessory interest in the property searched, or the target (person aggrieved) by the search to
establish standing. Jones, 362 U.S. at 264. The Court in Rakas, merely adopted this rule as
one of the many factors to establish whether there is standing. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
25
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133, 139; see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969) (citations omitted) (holding “we adhere to . . . the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (citations omitted)
(reaffirming Fourth Amendment rights are individual in nature).
26
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
27
Id. at 143.
28
Id. at 143 n.12. This standard was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the FBI listened to the defendant‟s private telephone conversation in a public phone booth with an electronic listening device. Id.
at 348. The Court distinguished between what a person knowingly shows to the public,
which is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, and what a person seeks to keep private.
Id. at 351 (citations omitted). This analysis considers actions that an individual takes to preserve their privacy that may trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 352. The Court
concluded in Katz that, given the circumstances, there was a subjective expectation of privacy of the individual in the telephone booth, because the individual takes steps to protect the
telephone conversation, which includes walking into a phone booth, shutting the door behind
them, paying the fee to place the call, uttering words into the receiver, with the expectation
that it will not be broadcast to the world. Id.
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Court, included property rights, whether the person is the owner,
whether the person may exclude others, and control over the property, which the Court also noted that, all of which, may not be enough
if there is no particular expectation in a specific location.29
Passenger standing in the vehicle context was extended by the
United States Supreme Court in Brendlin v. California.30 The Court
held that a passenger may challenge the constitutionality of a traffic
stop because they are seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.31 The Court reasoned that passengers are seized because they are halted when the police perform a traffic stop, and that
any reasonable person would not feel free to leave without the permission of the police.32 The Court concluded that because a passenger has standing to challenge the legality of the stop, if the police
conduct is unreasonable or exceeds the permissible scope of police
action, then the passenger may object to those constitutional violations and have any evidence found in the car suppressed.33 To determine this, the Court will examine the legality of the initial stop, the
length of time elapsed, and if an occupant has been removed from the
vehicle.34
In Brendlin, the defendant challenged the seizure of his person and the search of the car because there was no reasonable suspicion for the police to stop the vehicle.35 The police had observed the
car with an expired registration.36 However, when the officers called
into dispatch, they learned that a new registration was requested and
that it was legal to drive the car as is.37 The police then proceeded to
pull over the vehicle, despite the fact there was no reasonable suspicion with regards to the car.38 After approaching the car, the police
officer recognized Brendlin, the front-seat passenger, as a parole vi-

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
551 U.S. 249 (2007).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 255, 257.
Id. at 259 (citation omitted).
Id.
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 253.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id.
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olator and arrested him.39 A subsequent search of the car resulted in
incriminating evidence of illegal drugs.40 Applying the reasonable
person test, the Court determined that any reasonable passenger, under the circumstances, would have felt that they were under police
control and were not free to leave the situation at their will. 41 The
Court concluded that Brendlin was seized when the car was pulled
over and remanded the case to the state supreme court.42
Vehicles are treated differently under the law than real property in the context of standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment
search.43 In Minnesota v. Olson,44 the Court held that an overnight
guest may have a legitimate expectation of privacy depending on the
circumstances.45 The Court held that Olson‟s Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated when the police arrested him.46
In Olson, the police executed a warrantless arrest against Olson in a duplex he was staying in as an overnight guest.47 Subsequently, Olson made an incriminating statement at the police station,
while under arrest, that he moved to suppress as tainted by the illegal
arrest.48 The Court held that Olson had an expectation of privacy
39
40
41
42
43

44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 252.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 263.
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (citations omitted) holding that:
“The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected
by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one‟s person or of a building.” One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where its occupants and
its contents are in plain view. “What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.” This is not to say that no part of the interior of
an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one‟s right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion. But insofar as Fourth Amendment
protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the
touchstone of our inquiry.
495 U.S. 91 (1990).
Id. at 98.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94-95.
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similar to that of an owner of the dwelling, and that it was one society
would deem reasonable.49 The Court decided that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not limited to the absence of the true owner of
real property.50 According to the Court, a guest does not need complete dominion and control over the place to be searched to have his
or her Fourth Amendment rights violated.51
In its analysis, the Court in Olson, evaluated the reasonableness of the defendant‟s expectation of privacy as an overnight guest
against the objective standard society deems acceptable.52 The Court
stated that a host‟s overnight guest is a longstanding social custom,
and that at one point or another, every individual will be a host, or a
guest, and that no matter which way one looks at it, society does recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in another‟s home in those
circumstances.53 The Court reasoned that the guest is there because
of the advantages of keeping personal effects and possessions in the
host‟s home and there is an expectation that the home is private
enough not to be interfered with, even when one is sleeping.54 Further, the Court reasoned that a host shares privacy with a guest, and is
likely to honor that sphere of the guest even though there is no legal
interest in the property, because a guest will have some control over
the premises when the host is not present or asleep.55
In Minnesota v. Carter,56 the Court applied the standing factors from Olson, and held that the rights of the defendants were not
violated because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the premises.57 The defendants did not live in the apartment, and the
only reason for being present at the apartment was for the illegal
commercial activity of packaging cocaine.58 The Court reasoned that
49

Olson, 495 U.S. at 100.
Id. at 98-100.
51
Id. at 98.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Olson, 495 U.S. at 99.
55
Id.
56
525 U.S. 83 (1998).
57
Id. at 85. The Court also noted that the defendants were present in the apartment for
only a couple hours, and had never had any previous ties to the apartment. Id. at 86. A police officer observed the illegal activity through a crack in the window blinds from outside
the apartment, and defendants claim this was an unreasonable search. Id. at 85-86.
58
Id. at 86.
50

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 18

778

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

the apartment was used for commercial reasons, it was not their
home, and nothing indicated that the defendants had a significant
connection to the apartment.59 Therefore, the Court stated that the
defendants were merely permitted to be present in the apartment,
which did not give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy.60
New York precedent has largely relied upon and followed
Rakas v. Illinois in order to determine standing to challenge a Fourth
Amendment search.61 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, has stated that “[a] passenger in an automobile has standing to challenge the admissibility of any evidence
seized as a result of an alleged illegal stop.”62 This rule has been applied in a variety of vehicle stops under New York law.
For example, in People v. Madera,63 the court held that the
defendant, who was a passenger in an illegal stop, had standing to
challenge and move to suppress evidence as a result.64 The court reasoned that the police did not have a legitimate reason to stop the vehicle, because it was driven in accordance with the law, with the
permission of a family member of the owner, and none of the individuals in the car were engaged in suspicious activity at the time the
car was pulled over.65
The standing rule of a passenger to challenge the legality of a
stop has also been extended in New York beyond Rakas. For example, in People v. Millan,66 the court held that a taxicab passenger had
standing “to contest the legality of the stop of the cab and to seek
suppression of the weapon as the product of that allegedly unlawful

59

Carter, 525 U.S. at 90-91.
Id. at 91. Also, note the Court evaluated precedents set forth in Jones, 362 U.S. at 265,
and Rakas, 439 U.S. at 135, and concluded that “[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of
the householder may not.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 89-90.
61
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
62
People v. Dawson, 496 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1985).
63
509 N.Y.S.2d 36 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1986).
64
Id. at 37.
65
Id.
66
508 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987). In contrast, the court in People v. Ocampo, 492 N.Y.S.2d
695, 698 (Sup. Ct. 1985), held that a passenger does not possess standing to challenge an
unreasonable search and seizure if there is no possessory interest in the items seized or the
places searched.
60
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police conduct.”67
Fourth Amendment standing and the individuality of this right
are highlighted even further in New York precedent when it comes to
the vehicle operator‟s ability to challenge a stop and/or a resulting
seizure.68 In People v. May,69 the court held that the driver of a stolen
car had standing to challenge the illegal stop of the car and subsequent search, because he was stopped based on the officer‟s suspicion
of May‟s conduct.70
In May, the police observed a car parked on the side of a road
in the early morning hours.71 When the police pulled up behind the
car the defendant began driving away, which prompted the police to
use a loudspeaker to order the car to pull over; and the defendant
complied.72 When the officers called in the tags on the car, they were
advised it was a stolen vehicle, and a subsequent search revealed
drugs and a tampered steering column that was rewired.73 The court
reasoned that, given the circumstances, the police did not have a legal
basis for the stop at the point they ordered the car to pull over, and
that the defendant was stopped personally, which conferred the right
to challenge the search and seizure.74
Further, in People v. Voner,75 the court held that even the
driver of a car who disclaimed ownership of the vehicle has standing
to challenge an illegal stop by the police.76 In Voner, the police were
acting on a tip from a confidential informant that later turned out not
67
Millan, 508 N.E.2d at 904. Although the prosecution had charged the defendant with
the statutory presumption of possession N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15[3] (McKinney 2011), the
court nevertheless reaffirmed that passengers nonetheless have standing to challenge an illegal seizure and any resulting search as fruits of the illegal stop. Id.
68
See People v. May, 609 N.E.2d 113, 114 (N.Y. 1992) (holding car thief possessed
standing based on officer‟s individualized suspicion of driver); People v. Voner, 904
N.Y.S.2d 225, 227 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2010) (holding disclaimer of ownership did not negate driver‟s Fourth Amendment standing); People v. Cacioppo, 479 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265
(App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1984) (holding occasional use of another‟s vehicle insufficient to establish standing).
69
609 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1992).
70
Id. at 114.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
May, 609 N.E.2d at 114-15.
75
904 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2010).
76
Id. at 227.
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to give rise to probable cause under the Aguillar-Spinelli test.77 The
government argued that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the search, because he had no legitimate expectation of privacy,
because he denied ownership of the seized vehicle.78 The court stated
that standing to challenge a search of a vehicle was separate from the
right to contest the validity of a seizure and the defendant had the
right to seek suppression on those grounds.79
In People v. Cacioppo,80 the court held that the occasional use
of a vehicle did not give rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy.81
In Cacioppo, the defendant had an agreement with the vehicle owner,
that in exchange for $100 per month, the defendant would have occasional use of the car.82 The facts in the case revealed that the owner
exercised dominion and control over the car because it was registered
in his name only, and he kept the keys to the car.83 Further evidence
showed that the owner, the owner‟s spouse, and the defendant used
the vehicle, and the doors were kept unlocked.84
Based on these facts, the court in Cacciopo determined that
the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy because he was not the owner, the doors were not locked at the time of
the search, and he did not have his own set of keys to the vehicle.85
The court also noted that the defendant failed to allege that he exercised dominion and control over the vehicle by attempting to exclude
others.86
Although, New York precedent is broader in some aspects of
77

Id. at 226, 228. The Aguillar-Spinelli test was a two-part test that established criteria
for police to rely on informant information that required the police to confirm an informant‟s
reliability and veracity. Aguillar v. Texas, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1513-14 (1964), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). In Gates, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test instead. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
78
Voner, 904 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
79
Id.
80
479 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1984).
81
Id. at 265-66.
82
Id. at 265. The owner of the vehicle corroborated the defendant‟s interest and legal
claims in the vehicle and testified that he also allowed the defendant to store drugs in the car
for an additional $25 per week. Id.
83
Id.
84
Cacioppo, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
85
Id. at 266.
86
Id. Which the court also stated would help his argument that he possessed standing. Id.
Rather, the court noted that there was free access to the vehicle. Id.
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standing, it also places limits on passenger standing in an already stationary vehicle. The court in Howard stated that the police:
did not so interfere with defendant‟s freedom of
movement as to convert what otherwise was an indisputably lawful approach to a stationary vehicle based
on a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation into a vehicle
stop. The vehicle “was stationary prior to, and for a
reason independent of, the action of the police,” and
because its illegal placement attenuated defendant‟s
privacy interests, it cannot be said that the order to
move the vehicle implicated the Fourth Amendment
concerns associated with such stops.87
The legal implication of this language is that in an already stopped
vehicle that aroused suspicion by the illegal placement, gives rise to
lowered expectation of privacy therein.
The New York Court of Appeals established the above legal
principle in People v. Ocasio.88 In Ocasio, the police approached a
vehicle that was stopped at a traffic light in which Ocasio was a passenger.89 The police tapped on the window of the car, and asked for
identification.90 Ocasio provided a wallet to the officer that was not
his own.91 This aroused police suspicion, and led Ocasio to consent
to a search by the police for weapons.92 A subsequent inventory
search of the vehicle led police to discover a weapon and stolen cash
from the true owner of the wallet that the defendant handed to police.93
The court in Ocasio distinguished the rule of law between the

87
Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (citations omitted); see also People v. Ocasio, 652
N.E.2d 907, 908 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that standard to determine whether seizure occurred
was “whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the
officer‟s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom.”); People v. Thomas,
792 N.Y.S. 2d 472, 476 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1995) (holding parking in front of and blocking
defendant‟s car by police did not escalate intrusion upon defendant because his vehicle was
already stopped).
88
652 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1995).
89
Id. at 908.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d at 908.
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stop of a moving vehicle as opposed to that of a stationary one. 94 For
a parked car, the police only need an objective credible basis to approach a car.95 Then to determine whether a seizure has occurred it is
a reasonable person standard, whether a person would feel free to
walk away from police.96 The court in Ocasio, found that the police
requests were nonthreatening requests for basic information, which
resulted in a continued consensual encounter with the defendant,
which did not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.97
The courts in New York have also examined the ability of an
overnight guest to challenge a police search of a dwelling or home,
similar to the federal precedent on this topic. In People v. Rodriguez,98 the New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant had
no legitimate expectation of privacy in an apartment that police
searched and found illegal drugs.99 The defendant‟s ties to the
apartment were rather tenuous; he went to the apartment to buy
drugs, was sleeping on a sofa bed when the police arrived, and he
may have stayed there several times before.100 The court stated that
in order to have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place
searched, the expectation must be “reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.”101
The court in Rodriguez considered several factors to determine the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy including:
“whether the individual took precautions to maintain privacy, the
manner in which the individual used the premises and whether the
individual had the right to exclude others from the premises”102 The
court stated that a mere possessory interest is no longer sufficient by
itself, and must be considered in conjunction with the time spent by
94

Id. (citing People v. May, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. 1992); People v. Harrison, 443
N.E.2d 447, 450-51 (N.Y. 1982)).
95
Id. (citing Harrison, 443 N.E.2d at 450). A moving vehicle requires the police to have
a minimum of reasonable suspicion to justify a police stop and seizure. Id.
96
Id.
97
Ocasio, 652 N.E.2d at 909 (citing People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y.
1992)).
98
505 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1987).
99
Id. at 587.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 588. According to the court, reasonable is also based on what society is willing
to recognize as a privacy interest. Id. (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153).
102
Rodriguez, 505 N.E.2d at 588.
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the individual in a particular place, the purpose for the individual‟s
stay in the place that is searched, and included considerations of the
degree of connection to the apartment, such as clothing, expenses or
other household chores.103 The court, applying these factors, deemed
the defendant a transient, with no sense of an objective or subjective
expectation of privacy in the apartment that was searched.104
Also, in People v. Stanley,105 the defendant was convicted of
possession of a controlled substance, despite his contention that he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment that was
searched.106 The defendant had forced the lawful tenant out of the
apartment, did not have a lease, and did not pay rent.107 The court determined that there was no legally recognizable expectation of privacy in the apartment, because “any subjective expectation of privacy
[the defendant] manifested in the apartment was not objectively reasonable.”108
The New York Appellate Term‟s decision in People v. Howard, appears to be in line with what is now well-settled Fourth
Amendment law established under Federal and New York State precedents.109 Pursuant to the Federal and New York State Constitutions, individuals are protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures in their persons, places, and effects.110 The federal and New
York courts have interpreted this language to protect more than just
tangible items and to include things such as private conversations.111
Furthermore, the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures have gone far beyond property rights to establish standing to
challenge such a search.112 Rather, a property interest is no longer
103

Id.
Id. at 589.
105
856 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2008).
106
Id. at 222.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 222-23.
109
Federal and New York precedent are almost identical because the respective constitutions, U.S. CONST. amend. IV., and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
110
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
111
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (applying Fourth Amendment protections to individual in
public telephone booth); N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12 also states that “The right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall
not be violated . . .”).
112
See generally Jones, 362 U.S. at 264-65 (holding person aggrieved by search may have
104
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dispositive in this area of law and is now just one of many factors in
the test announced by the Supreme Court in Rakas.113
Specifically, in the context of stopped vehicles, there are two
ways to establish standing.114 One way to establish standing, is to
challenge the legality of a traffic stop by the police, which according
to Brendlin, a passenger may contest.115 The second way to establish
standing is to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
location that is searched, which according to Rakas, must be one that
society is prepared to accept as legitimate.116
In Howard, the defendant did not try to claim a privacy interest in the car to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. 117 Rather, Howard attempted to claim that, as the driver of the car or as the
passenger, the police stop was not legitimate and, therefore, it was illegal.118 However, Howard failed to take into consideration the surrounding circumstances of the initial police observation and approach
of the vehicle.119 The police‟s observation that the car was illegally
parked prompted the police to request that the car be moved, which
subsequently led to the plain-view observation of the gun.120 Given
the circumstances, the police did not seize the car and, therefore, did
not confer standing upon Howard to challenge the alleged stop and
search of the car.121
Further, the United States Supreme Court has found that a vehicle is merely a tool to travel, within plain view of outside eyes
looking inward, and, therefore, it is harder to find an objective expecstanding or person may assert some possessory interest in property); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143
n.12 (holding traditional concepts of property do apply; however, in the alternative, a legitimate expectation of privacy may also be based on what society is willing to recognize as legitimate or objectively reasonable); Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (holding Fourth Amendment protected an individual‟s private telephone conversation in public telephone booth); Rodriguez,
505 N.E.2d at 586, 587 (applying Fourth Amendment analysis to another‟s home in context
of overnight guest).
113
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43 (citations omitted).
114
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 259 (citation omitted); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (citations
omitted).
115
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 259 (citation omitted).
116
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (citations omitted).
117
Howard, 928 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/18

14

Belrose: Expectation of Privacy

2012]

EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

785

tation of privacy in such places that society is willing to recognize.122
This line of reasoning appears to make sense given the circumstances
of ordinary travel or commute. However, individual expectations
may vary greatly. It would appear that in cases such as Howard, that
either the individual has to be acting, for lack of a better word, unwise, or that they possess a subjective expectation of privacy in a vehicle from outside eyes. No matter which conclusion one comes to,
there is one thing that is clear - individuals must take steps to protect
their privacy in vehicles, just like they would to protect their privacy
in a dwelling. Otherwise, an individual is deemed to have waived his
or her expectation of privacy, which is half the battle of challenging a
search or seizure, and no legally recognizable right exists in terms of
standing.
Lisa Belrose

122

Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590-91 (citations omitted).
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